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THE DETENTION OF INSURRECTIONISTS:
A TIME TO RECONSIDER
by
William J. Flittie*
T HIS Article cannot be more than a preliminary statement. It is hoped
it will provoke investigation into the possibilities for containing revolu-
tionary insurrections aimed at overthrowing the Government.'
The threat of revolution, while in no sense immediately impending in
the United States, is a problem that is current and serious. The hard truth
is that it can happen here, and the conditions which would cause it could
develop quite suddenly. Consider the implications of the riots gunfights,
bombings, political kidnappings, and even murders which are daily fare in
our newspapers. Are we equipped to deal with the next escalation, active
insurrection, if it is in our future? Much is at stake. If we are not ready,
how do those of us who mean to preserve this Government best prepare
ourselves to do it? It will not be done by the wringing of hands and hoping
for the best, of that one can be sure.
From my reading of history I conclude that, were one a plotter of in-
surrection he could have no fonder hope than that his intended victims had
not prepared themselves in advance with carefully thought through means
to deal with his ilk. Such a posture necessitates hasty improvisations. These
responses may be inadequate to contain a revolution. More likely they
will be grossly excessive repressions that will so shame and discredit their
authors that the revolutionary cause is advanced even as it is defeated for the
moment. That result is not necessary. Preventive detention measures,
coolly and deliberately thought through, can be constructed to prevent either
eventuality. But we do not have them now. The Emergency Detention
Act of 1950, our only statute designed to deal with detention on a non-
criminal basis, was a most inadequate law, and it has now been repealed.2
* B.Sc.L., University of Minnesota; LL.B., Columbia University. Professor
of Law, Southern Methodist University.
1 The idea of citizen detentions is apt to arouse emotional response in many people
as being incompatible with constitutional liberties. This happens not to be the case,
a matter hereafter discussed in terms of the Japanese-American detentions of World
War II. Beyond these, consider that contempt-of-court detentions are accepted means
for enforcing legal obligations such as alimony and child support. Even more
stringent, to ensure their presence to testify at criminal trials virtually all Americanjurisdictions permit jailing of material witnesses if they cannot make bond to
guarantee attendance. 58 AM. JuR. Witnesses § 10 (1948). A recent case from a
liberal jurisdiction upholding witness detention is People ex rel. Van Der Beek v. McClos-
key, 18 App. Div. 2d 205, 238 N.Y.S.2d 676 (1963). Finally, people who are violently
insane are detained, in good part for the protection of the rest of us. The parallel
here with supporters of insurrection who would overthrow the Government supported
by their fellow citizens is rather plain.
2 Act of Sept. 23, 1950, ch. 1024, § 100, 64 Stat. 1019, amended by Act of Aug.
28, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-791, § 30, 72 Stat. 950, repealed by Act of Sept. 25, 1971,
Pub. L. No. 92-128, § 2(a), 85 Stat. 348. The background of the repeal was reported
in Hearing Related to Various Bills To Repeal the Emergency Detention Act of 1950,
91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). Sadly, as a result of the political emotionalism there
revealed, this country now stands in exactly the legal posture it stood in relation
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Without an adequate law the treatment accorded our Japanese-American
fellow citizens in World War II suggests the callousness to be anticipated
from essentially decent men when, suddenly and unprepared, they are con-
fronted with what they believe is a threat to their very existences.
I. THE EMERGENCY DETENTION ACT OF 1950
This statute, adopted contemporaneously with American involvement in
the Korean War, contained a fundamental defect which rendered it use-
less, or required a false application for it to be available in the type of in-
surrectionary situations presently most likely to occur. It could be im-
plemented by the President only in the event of invasion, declaration of
war, or domestic insurrection in aid of a foreign enemy.3 The limitation
was made all the more positive by concentrating the congressionally de-
clared statutory purpose upon the threat posed by traitorous allegiances to
foreign communist dictatorships. 4 Not for a moment to deny the very real
and perennial threat of international communism, and recognizing, too, that
communists rarely miss any opportunity to fish troubled waters, a realistic
observer of the contemporary scene still is compelled to the view that the
most serious current threat is from the so-called New Left, an indigenous
phenomenon now apparently bent on adopting the tactics of the Middle
Eastern and Latin American terrorist organizations, and the reactions to
it which can be triggered if its actions become aggressive enough to draw
them. 5 The same might be true of the violence prone elements which, by
persuasion and coercion, seek to assume leadership of the large Negro and
Latin racial minorities and league with the New Left, though these presently
are quiescent.
Another serious defect of this Act was that it lacked subtlety. In current
and foreseeable contexts it seems unlikely that the "crazies" of the several
extant revolutionary organizations have the power to accomplish their ends.
But they can, and well may in a rising tide of frustration and violence,
trigger a reaction which could end American democracy. Though the
pattern would be considerably different (one does not learn from history
by seeking perfect identity), it still would in essence be a repetition of what
happened to the between-the-wars Weimar Republic of Germany. When
the middle ground erodes away, ordinary and decent people can be forced
to choose between dictatorships of the right and left.6 The Germans chose
to the Japanese-American detentions of World War II, hereafter considered. If the
emergency need arises, one may expect again ad hoc executive responses, withoutguidelines to follow and thus the constant danger of unnecessarily forceful repression.3 Act of Sept. 23, 1950, ch. 1024, § 102, 64 Stat. 1021.
4 Id. §§ 101, 109(h), 64 Stat. 1019, 1026.
5 While the New Left extremists seem to have adopted a low profile recently, itis much too soon to forget their dedication to violence as exhibited in various bombings
and militant demonstrations on college campuses in recent years. Newly appointedAttorney General Saxbe discussed this subject in an interview reported verbatim in
U.S. NEws & WORLD REPORT, Feb. 4, 1974, at 25.6 For those who insist on indulging an assumption "it can't happen here" because
America somehow is different, please recall that as recently as 1964 most Americans
applauded the military dictatorship that seized power in Brazil as an alternative to
the communist dictatorship that threatened. In so doing they were making a
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Hitler over communism with tragic consequences-though this is not to sug-
gest that the world necessarily suffered more thereby than it would have
suffered had the decision gone the other way. It was a horrible alternative
that events forced upon the German people.
Thus, it would be well to have a statute that could be used to quell ser-
ious insurrectionary activities, even though themselves unlikely to succeed,
when it becomes evident their consequences are recruiting a reaction of even
more dangerous proportions. Certainly no special regard is owed revo-
lutionists whose only virtue is that they lack power. The test for our society
lies in weighing the impact of suppressing them upon the maintenance of
our democratic institutions. In effect, this means weighing the beneficial
and destructive aspects of suppression at particular points of time, a test
that is by no means constant but shifts according to how badly deteriorated
the political situation has become.
The structure of the Act itself merits these additional criticisms:
1. Apprehensions for detention were pursuant to the issuance of individ-
ual warrants. 7  Such a cumbersome procedure is wholly inadequate
for dealing with insurrectionary activities verging on warfare unless
sets of warrants are maintained and updated in about the same man-
ner as the military forces maintain war contingency plans.8 This,
I am reasonably confident, no friend of a free society would wish.
2. The standards for sheltering detainees from mistreatment and
economic loss were very inadequate. 9
3. The hearing procedure lacked expedition. It consisted, after ap-
prehension, of an initial formal hearing before a hearing officer. 10
If detention was ordered, review by a panel of the Detention Review
Board (created by the Act for the purpose) was had after a petition
seeking review was filed," the review to be, in effect, a de novo
hearing.' 2
4. The standard for decision was reasonable grounds to believe a person
will engage in espionage or sabotage. 8 This patently fails to cover
many types of dangerous insurrectionary activity.
5. Court review by the courts of appeal was provided, with the review
standard the administrative law's substantial evidence rule. 14 Both in
terms of the speed of dispositions and levels of certainty of involve-
political value judgment for others. Under the even more pressing circumstances of
direct involvement a comparable process of weighing the alternatives and opting for
the lesser of the evils could be expected.
7 Act of Sept. 23, 1950, ch. 1024, § 104, 64 Stat. 1022.
s The Canadian procedure dispenses with warrants. See note 43 infra.
9 Act of Sept. 23, 1950, ch. 1024, § 104(c), 64 Stat. 1022, provides for physical
care as determined necessary by the Attorney General. Id. § 104(g), 64 Stat. 1023,
provides that detainees cannot be forced to do labor or be confined as criminals. Bi-
monthly reports of actions taken to the President and Congress are required by id. §
104(h), 64 Stat. 1023, and id. § 109(a)(4), 64 Stat. 1025, permits indemnity for loss
of income, but only if a detention has been ordered without reasonable grounds.
'l d. § 104(d), 64 Stat. 1022.
1I Id. § 109(b), 64 Stat. 1025.
12 Id. §§ 105-09, 64 Stat. 1023.
13 Id. § 109(i), 64 Stat. 1027.
141d. § 111, 64 Stat. 1028.
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ment, better standards than those of the administrative law might
have been established.
6. The penalty for knowingly evading detention was set as high as a fine
of ten thousand dollars or ten years imprisonment, or both.' This
misapprehends the reasons underlying the statute. Detainees are not
criminals. (Presumably those against whom criminal charges could
be brought would be prosecuted rather than merely detained.)
Much lesser penalties, such as a sentence of one year, would seem en-
tirely adequate, and far more likely to enlist the aid of the general
citizenry in effecting apprehensions. The only real justification
for detentions is to get dangerous individuals out of circulation during
a critical period.
7. The writ of habeas corpus was not suspended.16 The United States
Constitution expressly provides for suspension of the great writ in
the face of insurrection. 17 The ancient wisdom of the founders of
this nation seems preferable to any present day sentimentality con-
cerning habeas corpus when the matter is so serious a one as choking
off revolution.
II. LEGAL BASES FOR SUPPRESSING INSURRECTIONISTS
A. Criminal Process
Apart from a few intellectual leaders of the Marcuse stamp, it is not often
possible to be an active insurrectionist without violating some criminal laws.
When, within the proof requirements that must be met for convictions, such
activities can be proved, the perpetrators can and should be held to answer
as criminals. In this vein it is to be noted that the Civil Disobedience Act of
1968'8 provides rather severe punishments for persons who teach the use of,
or use firearms and explosives in violent activities, crossing state lines to do
SO.
But there are grave defects in relying on the conventional criminal law to
control emergency situations. First, unless the criminal statutes are abused
by implementing their processes despite the fact that it is known the charges
cannot be proved, the most sophisticated and dangerous plotters will go un-
reached for about the same reason the leadership of that criminal govern-
ment within a government, the Mafia, has proved usually unreachable. It
15 Id. § 112, 64 Stat. 1029.
161d. § 116, 64 Stat. 1030.
17 "The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless
when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it." U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 9. Whether the President may himself suspend the writ is unclear.
Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (No. 9,487) (C.C. Md. 1861). The clash
between President Lincoln and Chief Justice Taney over this issue is described in
Martin, When Lincoln Suspended Habeas Corpus, 60 A.B.A.J. 99 (1974). In any
event, it seems clear that Congress may delegate authority to the President to make
suspensions, which need not be general but may be directed at defined groups of
persons. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866). Also, suspension of the
writ does not prevent judicial testing of the legality of particular actions by other
remedial devices of the law. Griffin v. Wilcox, 21 Ind. 370 (1863).
18 18 U.S.C. §§ 231-33 (1971).
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simply is exceedingly difficult to prove cases against men who provide the
brains while other men, often several times removed, provide the hands.
This is particularly true when the security of the chain of command is rein-
forced by what amounts to sacred oaths not to inform.
Secondly, and of even greater import, is the slowness of criminal enforce-
ment. This, coupled with the liberality of bail bond procedures, is a matter
which Chief Justice Burger considers the great barrier to efficient criminal law
enforcement. 19 In insurrectionary situations the time element is even more
pressing. Criminal prosecutions should be had in addition to detentions
where crimes can be proved, but it should be recognized that these are inade-
quate to control determined insurrectionists when their movements attain
power and momentum beyond the stage of a police problem, yet still are in
an incipient stage.
B. Martial Law
Martial law, where it can be applied, will permit severe mass population
controls such as curfews, area restrictions and the like, although in proceed-
ings against particular individuals the necessity of proving charges remains.
Martial law would be operative in situations of large scale civil war. To what
extent is it available in situations of incipient insurrection?
The ruling case comes from our Civil War, one of history's greatest insur-
rections. Styled Ex parte Milligan,20 it involved an attempt to execute, after
conviction by martial law, a civilian "copperhead" residing in Indiana, at a
distance from any actual military conflicts. A minority of four justices con-
tended for a larger scope of martial law jurisdiction in times of insurrection
and public danger, 21 but the five-justice majority strictly limited domestic
martial law applications to situations of invasion or insurrection, where the
courts are actually closed and incapable of administering the criminal laws.
22
(With considerable delicacy the tenor of the opinion also hints there could
have been no purpose in setting aside the usual criminal processes in the
particular case except to accomplish results different from what would have
been attained in the civilian court system.) The clash of viewpoints in this
close decision has not been squarely tested since, but dicta in the World
War II case of Duncan v. Kahanamoku2 3 makes it quite evident the more
restrictive majority view enjoys overwhelming favor, making it most un-
likely that the precedent of MUlligan could be overturned.
Often overlooked in Milligan is a statement that, on analysis, very clearly
would have been supported by all nine justices, to the effect that the military
can aid in an emergency by apprehending insurrectionists even though un-
19 Burger, The State of the Judiciary-1970, 56 A.B.A.J. 929 (1970).
20 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
21 Id. at 142.
22 Id. at 127.
23 327 U.S. 304 (1946). This case involved an attempt to supersede with martial
law normal criminal functions of the federal district courts. There was no combat
near the Hawaiian area at the time though Hawaii was a most important base for
operations against the Japanese forces. The square issue was avoided by interpreting




able to try them under less than near-battlefield conditions.24  In short,
MUlligan's apprehension by the Army was legal. But the main purpose of the
military is war, or the preparation for it. It will be well to hold military men
rather closely to their service. The soldier is not law trained except by hap-
penstance. When he is, he surely will be outranked by superiors who are
not. His tendency, consistent with his function, is to subordinate all he can
subject to his control to the goal of military victory. This is not mere sur-
mise. The dominant role played by the military in the Japanese-American
detentions of World War II, next considered, is a recent object lesson for
keeping the military as far as possible from citizen civilians. Also, this
miserable record is a lesson that elected officials, particularly presidents,
must not be allowed to shirk distasteful obligations by the expedient of dele-
gating the dirty work to others, such as military officers, who are not vul-
nerable to the restraints of the elective political processes.
C. The Japanese-Americans in World War IH
If the reader to this -point has wondered if there are strong precedents on
which to rest detention procedures, the answer, stemming from the Japanese-
American experiences in World War II, must be an emphatic yes.
The treatment during World War II accorded approximately 70,000 fel-
low Americans who happened to be of Japanese ancestry has been elabor-
ately researched and reported in a trilogy of books published under the
auspices of the University of California. 25 In these three volumes can be
examined in great detail one of the least attractive episodes of our national
history. It should be an example of how not to do it if ever again it be-
comes necessary to detain citizens deemed dangerous to the existence of the
rest of us. At the same time, because -the operative facts underlying the
court tests generated were so distasteful, and were so recognized by the Su-
preme Court Justices, there resulted a "hard case" test which should be of
unusual reliability in measuring the extent of power to deal on a non-crimi-
nal basis with population elements reasonable men could evaluate as in-
fested with state enemies.
Just how harsh was this treatment may be gathered from the following
brief statement: On the day of the Pearl Harbor attack, December 7,
1941, our Japanese-American fellow citizens were an unknown quantity.
Possessed of dual citizenship, many engaged in religious observances which
contained elements of worship of the emperor-ruler of the Japanese enemy
which had treacherously attacked our forces. It is quite understandable
they were viewed with apprehension. Yet, in the days and weeks which
followed hard upon the initial attack, surely most critical of all, no acts of
sabotage or espionage occurred. A Justice Department roundup of suspect
Japanese aliens, conducted from December 7, 1941, into February 1942, pro-
duced no hard evidence any sabotage or espionage was planned by mem-
24 71 U.S. (4 WaIl) at 125.
25 D. THOMAS & R. NIsmMoTO, THE SPOILAGE (1946); D. THOMAS, THE SALVAGE
(1952); J. TENBROEK, E. BARNHART & F. MATSON, PREJUDICE, WAR AND THE CON-
STITUrION (1954) [hereafter referred to as TENBRoEK].
[Vol. 27
DETENTION OF INSURRECTIONISTS
bers of the Japanese racial community. Neither on the West Coast nor in
Hawaii (where persons of Japanese ancestry, the dominant population ele-
ment, never were placed in detainee status) did hazards of substance beyond
men's imaginings develop. Despite this, in a Kafka-like sequence when the
real danger was past, beginning with February 19, 1942, governmental
machinery was set in motion which resulted in virtually all West Coast resi-
dents of Japanese blood-citizen and alien alike-men, women, and small-
est children-being placed behind wire under military guard in bleak desert
detention camps. There most remained until the war was nearly over. 26
Three important cases dealt with these events: the 1943 decision of
Hirabayashi v. United States,27 and the two 1944 decisions of Korematsu v.
United States28 and Ex parte Endo,29 these latter being decided the same
day. All of these cases involved American citizens. The factual context
was as follows. On February 19, 1942, seventy-four days after Pearl Har-
bor, President Roosevelt promulgated Executive Order No. 906630 au-
thorizing the Secretary of War, or military commanders designated by him,
to prescribe military areas and restrict the right of persons to enter, remain
in, or leave such areas. To perform these functions for the western United
States, the Secretary designated the general commanding the Western De-
fense Command. That general, by March 16, had designated the whole
Pacific coastal region (in which lived most persons of Japanese race who re-
sided in the continental United States) as Military Area No. 1, a zone for
maximum precautions. On March 18 the President, by another executive
order, established a civilian relocation board to handle population reloca-
tions contemplated. With this background before it, along with abundant
other information that the target population was persons of Japanese an-
cestry, the Congress then enacted Public Law 50331 providing criminal pen-
alties for violations of orders issued pursuant to the authority of Executive
Order No. 9066. Three days later the general commanding imposed a
curfew in Military Area No. 1 on German and Italian aliens, and on all per-
sons of Japanese ancestry including American citizens. Then commenced
the issuance of a series of exclusion orders, each affecting a part of Mili-
tary Area No. 1, applicable only to citizens and aliens of Japanese ancestry.
These orders were intended progressively to accomplish their removal from
Military Area No. 1. Actual physical departure was forbidden, however,
until it could be accomplished in a systematic and orderly manner. In the
meantime periodic reporting of whereabouts was required.32  Actual re-
movals involved reporting to designated assembly points, from whence these
persons were transported under military guard to central camps, there to be
held under guard indefinitely, until and unless released conditionally or un-
2 6 TENBROEK 99-184.
27 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
28 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
29 323 U.S. 283 (1944).
30 3 C.F.R. 1092 (1942).
31 Act of March 21, 1942, ch. 191, 56 Stat. 173, repealed by Act of June 25, 1948,
.h. 645, § 21, 62 Stat. 862.
32 320 U.S. at 83-91.
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conditionally.33 Five days notice to put their business affairs in order was
all that was given prior to actual removals and only the most Spartan per-
sonal effects were allowed to be taken. No significant custodial role for
property left behind was undertaken by the Government. Assembly was
completed by June 6, 1942, and lodgement in the camps by November 1,
1942. Most persons affected remained in the camps until December 1944,
when the order pursuant to which they were held was revoked.3 4
Hirabayashi, the first case, involved a willful curfew violation. Kore-
matsu involved the defiance of an exclusion order by deliberately remain-
ing in Military Area No. 1 after actual removal had been ordered and, for
all but recalcitrants, effected. Endo was a habeas corpus proceeding
testing detention in the camps despite the fact that Endo's personal loy-
alty to the United States was conceded by the Government. The United
States lost only the last case, prevailing without dissent in Hirabayashi
and by a 5-3 court division in Korematsu. In this division, however,
only the dissent of Justice Murphy questions the fundamental authority of
the United States severely to restrain citizens in circumstances of emergency
such as were there involved.35 The net effect is that there exists no dis-
cernible cleavage in these cases between the liberal activist faction of the
Court and the Justices of a more conservative and traditional bent. These
varying attitudes thus are a neutral factor in predicting future Court treat-
ment of detentions where reasonable grounds exist.
Hirabayashi, authored by Chief Justice Stone, exhibits some preliminary
difficulty with the fact the presidential proclamation preceded the congres-
sional enactment setting penalties for its violation, but reached the conclu-
sion Congress had "ratified and affirmed" the President's action, thereby
avoiding problems as to where the basic constitutional power to detain re-
sides.36  Then, going to the very heart of the problem, Chief Justice
Stone stated:
Whatever views we may entertain regarding the loyalty to this coun-
try of the citizens of Japanese ancestry, we cannot reject as unfounded
the judgment of the military authorities and of Congress that there
were disloyal members of that population, whose number and strength
could not be precisely and quickly ascertained. We cannot say that
the war-making branches of the Government did not have ground for
believing that in a critical hour such persons could not readily be iso-
lated and separately dealt with. . . .37
33 323 U.S. at 221-23, 228-31.
34 TENBROEK 124-30, 170-71.
35 323 U.S. at 233. Even Justice Murphy's objection was primarily to the crude
racial basis of classification, suggesting that he might have reasoned otherwise had
the classification process been more rational.
36 It probably resides in Congress. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, expressly confers
power to declare war, suppress insurrections, repel invasions, and "make all Laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution" powers vested in
the Government of the United States. On the other hand, presidential power must be
inferred from U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, imposing the obligation to uphold the Con-
stitution, and U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, making the President Commander-in-Chief.
See also note 17 supra.
37 320 U.S. at 99. Also, "lilt is a choice -between inflicting obviously needless




Concurring, Justice Douglas, a leading Court civil libertarian activist, took a
position which seems even stronger:
We cannot possibly know all the facts which lay behind the decision.
Some of them may have been as intangible and as imponderable as
the factors which influence personal or business decisions in daily
life ....
... Nor are we warranted where national survival is at stake
in insisting that these orders should not have been applied to anyone
without some evidence of his disloyalty. . . . [W]here the peril is
great and the time is short, temporary treatment on a group basis may
be the only practicable expedient whatever the ultimate percentage
of those who are detained for cause.3
8
Justice Black, another Court liberal, authored the majority opinion in
Korematsu. He engaged in a preliminary quibble as to whether he was
dealing with exclusion or detention, but this quibble surely evaporates in the
face of language as strong as "the power to protect must be commensurate
with the threatened danger,"3 9 and
[Korematsu] was excluded because we are at war . . . , because the
. . .military authorities feared an invasion . . . and felt constrained
to take proper security measures . . . . [T]he need for action was
great, and time was short. We cannot-by availing ourselves of the
calm perspective of hindsight-now say that at that time these actions
were unjustified. 40
Justice Douglas, writer of the opinion in Ex parte Endo, avoided the con-
stitutional issues of detention by interpreting the combination of Execu-
tive Order No. 9066 with Public Law 503 to mean that detention of an
admittedly loyal citizen never was authorized. In order that there could be
no misunderstanding of the Court's position, however, his opinion pointedly
declares:
We do not mean to imply that detention in connection with no phase
of the evacuation program would be lawful . . . .Some such power
might indeed be necessary to the successful operation of the evacua-
tion program. At least we may so assume. Moreover, we may as-
sume for the purposes of this case that initial detention in Relocation
centers was authorized. 41
It can only be concluded that unless and until these opinions are over-
turned (and this seems most unlikely, particularly when it is reflected that
the test can come only with the arrival of the emergency), detention of
citizens is permissible as part of a reasonable program designed to control
and cope with a grave national emergency. This being the case, it follows
that a solemn personal determination by the President pursuant to an au-
88 Id. at 106-07. But this caveat from Justice Douglas: "Whether an individual
member of a group must be afforded at some stage an opportunity to show that,
being loyal, he should be reclassified is a wholly different question." Id. at 108.
39 323 U.S. at 220-21.
40 Id. at 223-24.4 1 Id. at 301.
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thorizing act of Congress to the effect that insurrectionary activities in ac-
tual progress threaten the established national government, if supported
by facts which would permit reasonable men to reach that conclusion even
though others might differ, is an exercise of power the Supreme Court very
plainly has found to reside in the national government.
At this point, too, a little common sense is in order. If the crisis of insur-
rection ever is allowed to descend upon us in circumstances where there is
not a carefully developed plan for dealing with it, it is certainty that sup-
pression will follow, and it will be attended by considerable mistreatment
of those swept up as suspected insurrectionists. The behavior of some
of our most prominent political liberals in the Japanese-American debacle
makes this very predictable.42 Moreover, domestic insurrection looses the
worst passions of all. Thus, in addition to being prudent, it very much rec-
onciles with civilized behavior to chart the way now, before passions are
aroused and while we are capable of dealing with it in cool blood. The
failings of the common clay are more common in all of us than it is fashion-
able to admit.
III. SOME CONSIDERATIONS UNDERLYING THE DETENTION
OF INSURRECTIONISTS
Any satisfactory legislation designed to curb insurrection must in great
part be the product of original thought. Most of the experience of the past
is ad hoc experience that was practically certain to, and did, produce
deplorable results. But there are some areas profitably to be investi-
gated. Here it is not possible to go beyond suggestion, for at this point a
funded project becomes necessary.
1. Basic to the whole matter of detentions are the abilities of our police
and security forces, on short notice, to identify and apprehend sub-
stantially all activists in any defined insurrectionary movement; then
provide information which will make it possible to segregate out the
really dangerous ones in order that the balance of those appre-
hended may be freed in a matter of a few days. It is pure surmise
on my part, but as a matter of judgment I believe there is no insur-
rectionary movement now existing, or likely to exist, which cannot be
broken if deprived of the presence of no more than a thousand per-
sons-provided, of course, these are the right ones, 43 and provided
further the insurrection is caught at inception.
42TENBROEK at 111-12, 172, 331, deals with President Franklin Roosevelt; at
83-84, 93, 203, 267-68 with Earl Warren, then Attorney General of California, later
Governor of California and Chief Justice of the United States; at 85 with the com-
ments of columnist Walter Lippman. It is not intended hereby to suggest that the
performance on the conservative side was any better. It was not. What is intended
is to demonstrate that no man, regardless of political bent, should be placed in a
position of having to deal with people in time of crisis on an ad hoc basis if it can
reasonably be avoided.
43 Perusal of 1970 FBI ANN. REP. 33-36 and 1971 FBI ANN. REP. 31-35, although
they contain no figures, permits a common-sense evaluation. Consider, too, that in
Canada the suppressed FLQ (Le Front de Liberation du Quebec) which, in October
1970, kidnapped as hostages British Trade Commissioner Cross and Quebec Labor
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2. An extensive survey should be made to establish the existence and con-
tents of foreign statutes and regulations for the detention of insurrec-
tionists. Particular attention should be paid the existence of such
laws in nations adhering to the Western political tradition which we
share. There are such laws. Some have been implemented quite re-
cently. 44 Beyond this, where detentions actually have been made,
the success or lack of success attained should be closely studied. It
is as important to know why actions, in a degree, fail as why they
succeed.
3. An effective program of initial apprehensions is certain to capture
Minister LaPorte, murdering the latter, is estimated to have had only 130 active
members organized in 22 cells plus 2,000 "conspiratorial sympathizers." N.Y. Times,
Oct. 17, 1970, at 12, col. 1. Of course, hidden among the "conspiratorial
sympathizers" may well have been some of the most dangerous leadership elements,
while some of the active members may have been relatively harmless if shorn of
leadership. This type of breakdown would be more meaningful, and probably could
be developed if the situation were investigated at length.
44 To suppress the FLQ in Canada the Canadian Federal Government on October
16, 1970, implemented its War Measures Act, CAN. REv. STAT. c. W-2 (1970).
This short and very broadly drawn statute authorizes arrest, detention, exclusion, and
deportation in the event of proclaimed insurrection, real or apprehended. The imple-
mentation was accomplished through issued regulations which, in effect, made member-
ship or acts in support of the FLQ into crimes punishable by up to five years imprison-
ment. This was done on what appears to be an ex post facto basis that would be
constitutionally objectionable in this country, and no reason is apparent in the War
Measures Act itself why the criminal structure needed to be followed. Arrest and
search without warrant were authorized, with detentions of up to 21 days without
filing of criminal charges permitted. N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1970, at 12, col. 1.
The Canadian Government sustained severe criticism from its opposition for acting
so harshly to deal with so small an insurrectionary movement. N.Y. Times, Nov. 1,
1970, at 15, col. 1. The War Measures Act thereupon was superseded by the Public
Order (Temporary Measures) Act, 1970, 19 Eliz. 2, c. 2 (Can.), to be in effect until
not later than April 30, 1971. This statute is structurally the enactment of the
prior regulations, except that it is more narrowly aimed at the FLQ, and the maximum
interval a person can be held without filing criminal charges is reduced to seven days.
N.Y. Times, Nov. 3, 1970, at 1, col. 3.
By far the most pervasive recent law dealing with insurrection is the Northern
Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1973, c. 53, superseding the Civil Authorities
(Special Powers) Act (Northern Ireland) 1922, 12 & 13 Geo. 5, c. 5. Addressed
specifically to the recurring civil strife in Northern Ireland, the statute confers upon
Her Majesty's forces on duty and local enforcement officials broad powers of arrest
and detention. Upon suspicion of commission of acts of terrorism or other acts
proscribed by the statute and without warrant or other authorization, any person may
be stopped, questioned, searched, arrested and detained, all by whatever means
necessary. Search of dwellings must be authorized by higher officials. Detention
by British military forces is limited to four hours, but detention by local officials
may be for as much as 72 hours, after which time detainees must be brought before
a commissioner appointed by the Secretary of State for the purpose of reviewing the
need for continued detention. Detention can thereafter continue indefinitely, subject
to timely and proper review of the entire case. Appeal may be had to a specially
created tribunal. As of October 21, 1973, 649 persons were detained pursuant to
the Act. Letter from J.F.W. Judge of the British Attorney General's office to William
J. Flittie, Oct. 31, 1973. Although this Act may well be offensive to the United States
Constitution in its search and seizure provisions and its criminal as opposed to detention
aspects, it nevertheless deserves study as an organized and rational response to a serious
insurrection in a Western nation, the legal traditions of which are the very stem whence
.comes our American law.
Incident to suppressing a secret armed conspiracy to kidnap leading citizens and rob
banks for political ends, the Prime Minister of Ireland indicated that, if necessary,
Part II of the Offenses Against the State Act, Statute No. 2 of 1940, would be invoked.
This statute authorizes internment without trial in detention centers. N.Y. Times, Dec.
5, 1970, at 1, col. 5. This Act was last invoked in 1957. Letter from Kevin Mangan
of the Irish Attorney General's office to William J. Flittie, Feb. 17, 1971.
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some persons innocent of involvement, or at least it must be so as-
sumed. It further must be assumed that some of these persons will
continue in custody after initial processing by reason of human error,
and the caution an emergency such as insurrection will arouse in many
men. The prospect of apprehended persons voluntarily submitting
themselves to polygraph testing45 and perhaps other scientific means
of lie detection as a final step in the rapid processing procedures
should be investigated. Detainees, of course, finally should be af-
forded regular hearing procedures, but these take time. If it is possible
to winnow out a significant portion of those whose apprehension is
erroneous prior to reaching this stage through use of scientific tests,
this should be done.
In summary, careful inquiries are needed into the capabilities of the po-
lice and security forces to identify and classify insurrectionists, into the laws,
regulations, and experiences of nations that have detention statutes, and into
possible means for expediting ,the processing of apprehended persons so that
the need to hold people for the intervals that will be required to complete
formal hearing procedures will be reduced to the greatest extent possible.
IV. POINTS To BE CONSIDERED IN FRAMING A STATUTE
At this stage only tentative conclusions are in order. With that ad-
monition, these points are advanced as matters to be considered in framing
a detention statute designed to reach domestic insurrectionists.
1. All types of insurrectionary activity should be covered.
2. The President should have the sole responsibility for defining the class
45 In essence this problem reduces to whether the polygraph yields results of equal
or better accuracy than the judgment of human fact finders. Its chief proponents, basing
their conclusion on over 35,000 tests, say the percentage of known error is less than
one percent, with about five percent of the tests rejected as too untrustworthy to analyze
due to psychological or physiological impairment of the examinees. J. REID & F.
INBAU, TRUTH AND DECEPTION 234 (1966). A collection of papers presented at the
University of Tennessee Symposium on the Polygraph also deals with the accuracy
problem. 22 TENN. L. Rav. 711-74 (1953). A leading commentator on the law of
evidence has stated that the exclusion of the lie detector test results from trials is not
justified. C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 207 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972). Typical of
polygraph criticisms is Skolnick, Scientific Theory and Scientific Evidence: An Analysis
of Lie Detection, 70 YALE L.J. 694 (1961), which plays with statistics by varying
assumptions of how many "guilty" are in the base of examinees to be tested to produce
widely fluctuating results. This type of criticism does not fare well in the face of the
real situation to be anticipated. Assume a group already processed by police file
evidence contains 90 insurrectionists and 10 innocent persons. If all elect to be tested,
and there is as much as a five percent error, it means that about five insurrectionists
will be freed erroneously and one person innocent of involvement will be held errone-
ously. Such results are certainly tolerable from the standpoint of reducing inevitable
error against the innocent to a minimum while at the same time so decimating the
insurrectionist organization as to break its effectiveness. Most objection to the use of
polygraph evidence arises in the context of proving criminal guilt, or establishing inno-
cence. It must be conceded that were its use to become general, there would result a
situation where defendants refusing the test would, in effect, be compelled by indirec-
tion to testify against themselves. Juries are not stupid. But in a noncriminal context
this test (which can be given only to cooperative subjects) seems unobjectionable except
from the standpoints of insurrectionists who do not wish their organizations broken, the
sympathizers with insurrectionary ends, and that element among us which believes




or classes of persons to be detained, and for ordering their appre-
hensions.
3. The President should be authorized to act only when (a) actual overt
acts of violence have occurred and (b) in his judgment, a substantial
direct or indirect threat to the security of the national government
exists. His judgment also should be subject to reasonable and re-
sponsible checks by the legislative branch.
4. The administration of detentions should be in the hands of a com-
mission, the membership of which is drawn from state governments,
not the federal government, and the quality of which makes its ac-
tions certain to command the highest public confidence. The com-
mission should not exist as an operating entity except when an emer-
gency has been declared under which actual detentions are in
progress. If there is any area where a continuing bureaucracy is not
desired, this is it.
5. As is permitted by the Constitution, the writ of habeas corpus should
be suspended in the case of suspected insurrectionists held for deten-
tion or detained. However, full legal testing of all issues arising out of
these detentions through procedures such as declaratory judgment
should be allowed to proceed in the courts.
6. Persons apprehended should be given every reasonable opportunity to
establish non-involvement, including voluntary polygraph testing, in
order that they not be held for and subjected to lengthy formal hear-
ings where these can be avoided.
7. To be effective, apprehensions without warrants must be permitted.
These are not criminal proceedings. They are emergency detentions.
Not warrants, but reliable means for very rapidly processing persons
apprehended are what are wanted.
8. Detainees must be made secure from physical mistreatment and eco-
nomic loss arising from their detentions.
9. Detainees should be offered the options of detention under close con-
trol in the general areas of their residences, or detention with con-
siderably more relaxed controls in distant parts of the country of their
own choosing. In all detentions continued engagement in normal le-
gitimate business and study activities should be permitted to the degree
feasible.
10. Detainees and their dependents should not be subjected to reduced
living standards, except possibly in the case of insurrectionists who
happen to be persons of wealth.
11. Criminal penalties should be light, and limited to the offenses of es-
caping or willfully avoiding detention. The general public, and the
family and friends of insurrectionists, will be far more cooperative in
helping with apprehensions if the penalties are light. Again, remem-
ber that detainees are not criminals per se. The big objective is not to
punish, but to get them out of circulation in a critical period. At the
same time, it must be recognized we deal here with powerful political
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motivations. This could result in very great force being required to
apprehend some detainees. The actions of the police charged with
effecting these apprehensions should be measured accordingly when is-
sues of excessive use of force are raised.
V. CONCLUSION
Every rational man knows that serious insurrection is going to be stren-
uously resisted. If that resistance is ad hoc and unplanned, much avoidable
mistreatment of fellow human beings will result. Some persons, including
members of Congress, seem to prefer it that way. 4 6 I do not. I do not
think a majority of Americans who will consider the implications of being
without a statutory plan of control will prefer unreadiness. If this be true,
let us address ourselves to the preparation of a statute. One thing is very cer-
tain as this is written. As of now we are not ready.
46 The repeal of the Emergency Detention Act of 1950 was effected, not for the
purpose of substituting a better statute, but to wipe detention procedures from the na-
tional statutes. This effort was primarily led by Japanese-American members of Con-
gress from Hawaii, and it is said to be rested in good part on their resentment against
the Japanese-American detentions of World War J1. N.Y. Times, March 19, 1971, at
32, col. 1. This was a tragically misguided effort. The Japanese-American debacle
occurred because we did not have a statutory blueprint for dealing with the problem,
for it is unthinkable that a statute, written without the press of crisis, would authorize
anything like what was done then.
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